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NOTE
WHAT DOES THE FOX SAY1: DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, PERSONAL JURISDICTION, AND
THE STATE’S SOVEREIGNTY IN DECLARING
THE PROTECTED STATUS OF ITS CITIZENS
AARON EDWARD BROWN2
I am living in hell from one day to the next. But there is
nothing I can do to escape. I don’t know where I would go if I
did. I feel utterly powerless, and that feeling is my prison. I en-
tered of my own free will, I locked the door, and I threw away the
key.3
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1985, Gerald Cole and Barb Hughs began a romantic relationship.4
At the time they met, Barb Hughs was pregnant and, while she and Mr.
Cole lived together in New Jersey, she gave birth to a son.5 Although the
child was not Mr. Cole’s biological son, when the couple separated, Mr.
Cole asked the Superior Court of New Jersey to adjudicate him as the legal
father of the child and grant him reasonable parenting time.6  The court
granted his requested relief and allowed him parenting time every year dur-
ing the summer months of June, July, and August.7
1. YLVIS, The Fox (What Does the Fox Say?) (Urheim Records and 45th & 3rd Music LLC
under exclusive license to Parophone Music Norway A Warner Music Group Company) (2013).
2. J.D., University of St. Thomas, School of Law; B.A., University of St. Thomas (MN).
The author is very appreciative to Professors Gregory Sisk and Michael Boulette for their input
and counsel with this Note. The author would also like to thank his mentors, Tonya D.F. Berzat,
Dorrie B. Estebo, and Nancy Berg; his mother, Pamela Brown; his grandfather, Richard Perkins;
and his girlfriend, Kjerste Gast, for their guidance and inspiration.
3. HARUKI MURAKAMI, 1Q84, 167–168 (Vintage International Reprint ed., Jay Rubin trans.,
2013).
4. Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole, 572 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
530
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From 1989 through 1996, the child visited his father, who now lived in
Pennsylvania.8 In 1996, Barb Hughs and the child moved to Minnesota, and
a few months later, Barb Hughs filed a petition for an order for protection
(“OFP”) on behalf of her son.9 Through her affidavit and testimony, she
described numerous occasions in which Gerald Cole abused their son when
he visited Mr. Cole during the previous two summers.10 These incidents
included occasions of physical violence, such as punching and slapping the
minor child.11 The violence became so consistent and pervasive for the then
ten-year-old boy that, upon his return to his mother’s custody, he refused to
go back to his father’s house, stating that he would run away if he was
forced to go back.12  The Minnesota District Court for Wright County en-
tered an OFP for the minor child, and the father appealed, citing a lack of
personal jurisdiction.13
The legal issue presented in Hughs was relatively simple: did the Min-
nesota District Court possess personal jurisdiction over the defendant, even
though the defendant had never been to Minnesota?14 For a Minnesota court
to have personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, two criteria
must be met. First, one criterion listed in Minnesota’s long-arm statute must
be met.15 Second, “minimum contacts” must exist between the defendant
and the state to satisfy due process.16
In its plain language, Minnesota’s long-arm statute was designed to go
as far as due process will allow.17 One of the provisions of Minnesota’s
long-arm statute is that a Minnesota court may exercise personal jurisdic-
tion if the defendant commits an act outside of Minnesota that causes injury
in Minnesota.18 In Hughs, due to the pervasive psychological effects the
physical violence had on the minor child, the district court had no problem
finding that continuing damage was affecting the boy and the damage was
caused by acts his father committed outside the state.19
By finding that Minnesota’s long-arm statute did, in fact, reach Mr.
Cole, the district court was then required to find that the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution was satisfied. In other words, Mr.
Cole had sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Minnesota such that
8. Id. at 748–749.
9. Id. at 749.
10. Hughs, 572 N.W.2d at 749.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Mr. Cole also did not transact any business in Minnesota or own any property in
Minnesota.
15. Sherburne Cty. Soc. Serv. ex rel. Pouliot v. Kennedy, 426 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn.
1988).
16. Id.
17. See Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408, 411–412 (Minn. 1992).
18. MINN. STAT. § 543.19, subd. 1(4) (2008).
19. Hughs, 572 N.W.2d at 750.
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the Hughs court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction did not offend “tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”20 Minnesota courts ex-
amine the latter criterion through a five-prong test: (1) the quantity of
contacts within the State of Minnesota; (2) the nature and quality of those
contacts; (3) the connection between the contacts and the cause of action;
(4) the State’s interest in providing a forum; and (5) the convenience of the
parties.21 In summary, the dispositive question before a court analyzing fair
play and substantial justice is whether the non-resident purposefully availed
him or herself of the benefits and protections of the law of the forum state.22
In finding that Mr. Cole had purposefully availed himself to the State,
the Hughs court noted that Mr. Cole called the home of the minor child
repeatedly.23 More importantly, however, since Mr. Cole knew the minor
child resided in Minnesota during the abuse, he knew or reasonably should
have known that a Minnesota court would resolve custody and visitation
matters.24 While there were not a significant number of contacts, there were
enough to satisfy the first prong of the statute.25 Additionally, the nature
and quality of the contacts satisfied the second prong of the statute.26
The crux of purposeful availment, however, is the relationship between
the contacts and the cause of action. The most dispositive contact Mr. Cole
possessed (his son) was directly related to the cause of action; namely, a
pending OFP to prevent him from continuing to abuse the minor child.27
There is no denying that since the son’s primary residence was in Minne-
sota, Mr. Cole foresaw or should have foreseen that his abuse of his son
would have possible consequences, not only in Pennsylvania (where the
abuse occurred), but also in Minnesota.28
While the last two prongs are not as dispositive, the Hughs court noted
that they still overwhelmingly weighed in favor of establishing personal
jurisdiction. Minnesota has an interest not only in protecting the physical
and emotional health of a minor resident, but also the convenience of the
parties weighed in favor of the minor.29
20. Id. (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
21. Kennedy, 426 N.W.2d at 868; Mahoney v. Mahoney, 433 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1998) (finding that the first three factors in the analysis are given more weight in a determi-
nation than the last two factors).
22. See Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Serv., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn.
1983).
23. Hughs, 572 N.W.2d at 751.
24. Id. Put another way, it was reasonable for Mr. Cole to see the consequences of his abu-
sive behavior towards his son being addressed in the state where his son resided.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Hughs, 572 N.W.2d at 751. The court found that the convenience of the parties weighed
in favor of the minor because the child, the mother, and the child’s psychologist all lived in
Minnesota.
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Given the totality of the circumstances and the road map created by the
Supreme Court of the United States in International Shoe,30 the Minnesota
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding of personal jurisdiction
over Mr. Cole.31 However, what would have happened if the facts were
different? For example, what if all the parties resided together in Penn-
sylvania and then after the abuse occurred to Ms. Hughs, she and the minor
child fled to seek safety away from Mr. Cole by moving to Minnesota?
While these are not the facts in Hughs, the unfortunate truth is that this
scenario occurs with relative frequency. While the exact numbers are im-
possible to obtain, we do know that one out of four women and one out of
seven men will be victims of severe physical violence by an intimate part-
ner during their life.32 We also know that one in three female murder vic-
tims are killed by their intimate partner33 and that women are seventy times
more likely to be killed in the two weeks after leaving their intimate partner
than at any other time during the relationship.34 Because of these frighten-
ing realities, many victims of domestic violence leave their abuser to seek
safety and shelter with friends, relatives, or in battered women shelters; in
some instances these safe havens are located outside the state where the
violence occurred.
In the past decade and a half that interstate domestic violence35 has
been a recognizable issue, only a handful of state courts have addressed
whether a trial court needs personal jurisdiction over a defendant in order to
enter an OFP.36 Further, as of now, there is no uniform policy for handling
interstate domestic violence cases. However, the majority of the states that
have addressed this issue have concluded that when there is no personal
jurisdiction over the alleged abuser, the state court can still enter a valid
OFP37 based on the status of the victim as a protected person as long as no
30. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 310 (1945).
31. Hughs, 572 N.W.2d at 752.
32. The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey: 2010 Summary Report,
NAT’L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 2–3
(Nov. 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf.
33. F. Stephen Bridges, et al., Domestic Violence Statutes and Rates of Intimate Partner and
Family Homicide: A Research Note, 19 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 117, 118 (2008).
34. Alanna Vagianos, 30 Shocking Domestic Violence Statistics That Remind Us It’s An Epi-
demic, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 23, 2014, 9:25 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/23/
domestic-violence-statistics_n_5959776.html.
35. Interstate domestic violence in this Note will refer to the situation when abuse transpires
in State A, and the victim leaves the state to seek shelter in State B, which is a state that does not
have personal jurisdiction over the alleged abuser.
36. See In re T.L. v. W.L., 820 A.2d 506, 513 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2003); Becker v. Johnson, 937
So. 2d 1128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa 2001); Spencer v.
Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006); Caplan v. Donovan, 879 N.E.2d 117 (Mass. 2008);
Hemenway v. Hemenway, 992 A.2d 575 (N.H. 2010); Fox v. Fox, 106 A.3d 919, 926 (Vt. 2014);
Shah v. Shah, 875 A.2d 931 (N.J. 2005).
37. Orders for protection are also commonly referred to as: victim protection orders, abuse
prevention orders, relief-from-abuse orders, order of protection, protective order, etc. For simplic-
ity’s sake, I will refer to all of these orders simply as “orders for protection,” or, “OFPs.”
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affirmative obligations are imposed.38 Throughout the years, several lower
state courts have disagreed with the majority.39  Until 2015, no state court
of last resort had conclusively found personal jurisdiction was required to
enter a valid OFP. In January 2015, however, the Supreme Court of the
United States denied a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Vermont
Supreme Court’s decision in Fox v. Fox, 106 A.3d 919 (Vt. 2014).40 In Fox,
the Vermont Supreme Court held that entering an OFP against an out-of-
state defendant violated his substantive due process rights when the trial
court did not have personal jurisdiction over him.41 While the author agrees
with the decision rendered by the Vermont Supreme Court in part and dis-
agrees in part, the now pronounced state split exemplifies the need for uni-
form laws that protect interstate victims of domestic violence and protect
the due process rights of the alleged abusers.
Because of the undesirability of two (or three) inconsistent legal rul-
ings amongst sister states, this Note makes the case for two potential solu-
tions. Both solutions represent legal remedies that provide victims with
safety, while respecting the rights of defendants. Solution one consists of a
statute that allows a state district court to enter an OFP without personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. The relief that may be granted under this
statute is an order that precludes any type of contact by the respondent that
is directed toward the petitioner. In addition, the order can state that the
respondent may not break any of the laws of the state in which the order is
issued. Other frequently used provisions such as a restriction on the right to
travel and restriction on firearm rights would be precluded under the statute
for reasons discussed later in this Note.42
Solution two would be for state legislatures to pass a uniform law
known as the Interstate Domestic Violence Jurisdiction Act (“IDVJA”).
IDVJA would allow the forum state to transfer jurisdiction to the recipient
state (e.g. the state that has personal jurisdiction over the respondent). This
statutory scheme would operate in a similar fashion to the Uniform Inter-
state Family Support Act (“UIFSA”)43 with additional provisions from the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”)44
such as temporary emergency jurisdiction.
At the time this article was written, two commentators have discussed
whether orders for protection (“OFPs”) may be granted in instances where
the trial court does not have personal jurisdiction over the alleged abuser.
The first commentary, by Bevan J. Graybill, argues that personal jurisdic-
38. See Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 5; Caplan, 879 N.E.2d 117 at 471; Hemenway, 992 A.2d at
582; Spencer, 191 S.W.3d at 19.
39. See In re T.L., 820 A. 2d at 515–516; Becker, 937 So. 2d at 1132.
40. Fox v. Fox, 135 S. Ct. 952 (2015).
41. See Fox, 106 A.3d at 929.
42. See discussion infra Sections III.B.1.i–ii.
43. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2008).
44. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENF’T ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997).
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tion is needed because OFPs are tantamount to civil injunctions, and thus
require personal jurisdiction over a nonresident alleged abuser.45 The sec-
ond article, authored by Jessica Miles, argues that personal jurisdiction is
not required to enter an OFP.46 Miles’s article suggests that the best method
going forward is for state courts to enter temporary orders that can be con-
tinually renewed until a court with personal jurisdiction can enter a final
OFP. Since these two articles were published, an additional court of last
resort has weighed in on this issue and concluded that personal jurisdiction
is required to enter an OFP against an out-of-state defendant.
This Note attempts to contribute to the existing scholarship in two dis-
tinct ways. First, this Note delves further into the liberty interests that are
exposed by traditional OFPs and explains which of these interests could
potentially still be infringed without personal jurisdiction. This analysis is
important in understanding exactly what kind of relief could be granted in
an OFP without personal jurisdiction while still comporting with due pro-
cess. Second, based on the analysis of the first set of considerations, I pro-
pose two separate solutions. These two solutions are meant to take into
consideration the interests of both victims and alleged abusers, while also
crafting legislation that recognizes the need to resolve this type of issue
now that state courts of last resort have officially split on whether OFPs can
fall within the status exception.
To that end, Part II of this Note begins by recounting the ways states
presently procure personal jurisdiction over an individual.47 Part II then
summarizes the existing case law starting with the decisions that rely on the
‘status’ exception to fill in for traditional personal jurisdiction requirements.
Part II then moves to the decisions that deny the status exception as inappli-
cable to interstate domestic violence cases. Part III of this Note explains the
various problems with both the majority and minority view on interstate
domestic violence cases.48 Part III also discusses the many individual rights
that are implicated when an OFP is issued and which of these rights may
still be infringed without personal jurisdiction. Lastly, Part IV presents two
solutions in the author’s attempt to create a uniform system of laws that not
only protects victims from domestic violence, but also grants the alleged
abuser due process under the law and remains true to over a century of
jurisprudence regarding personal jurisdiction and state sovereignty.49
45. Bevan J. Graybill, Comment, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: Why Personal Jurisdiction is Re-
quired to Issue Victim Protection Orders Against Nonresident Abusers, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 821
(2011).
46. Jessica Miles, We Are Never Ever Getting Back Together: Domestic Violence, Defend-
ants, and Due Process, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 141 (2013).
47. See infra Section II.A.
48. See infra Sections III.A–B.
49. See infra Part IV.
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II. HISTORY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, THE STATUS EXCEPTION, AND
RELEVANT CASE LAW
A. Recognized Ways to Establish Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction deals with a court’s ability to enter a binding
judgment over both parties subject to litigation. A state’s ability to exercise
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is limited by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as established in International
Shoe.50 Specifically, the Supreme Court noted that the court must have per-
sonal jurisdiction over a defendant when entering “a valid judgment impos-
ing a personal obligation or duty in favor of the plaintiff.”51 Thus, the
prevailing rule gleaned from International Shoe has been that, if a court
wants to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, that
defendant must have such minimal contacts that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”52
There are several ways in which a petitioner in an OFP case might
establish that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. First,
personal jurisdiction may be established if the act that gave rise to the pro-
ceeding was committed in the forum state.53 For example, jurisdiction may
be established if the out-of-state defendant committed the alleged abuse
within the state.54  Second, state courts may find personal jurisdiction ex-
tends in instances where the alleged abuser contacts the victim inside the
forum state. This communication could include anything from phone calls,
e-mails, Facebook messages, etc. In Calder v. Jones, the Supreme Court
developed an “effects test,” which extends personal jurisdiction into com-
munication directed into the state.55 Calder specifically dealt with an article
that was drafted in Florida but circulated through California and eventually
harmed a California resident.56  These “effects” gave California personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.57 This reasoning stems from the idea that
the defendant knew or should have known that his acts in California could
cause damage to such a degree that it would be fair for him to be sued in
California.58 Many states capture the “effects” test with a rule allowing a
state court to find personal jurisdiction when a defendant commits an act
50. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 310 (1945).
51. Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 732–733 (1878)); Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
52. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
53. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 543.19, subd. 1(3) (2016).
54. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201(3) (2016).
55. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
56. Id. at 789–790.
57. See id.
58. See id.
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outside of the state, which causes injury or damage to property within the
state.59
There are several other ways in which personal jurisdiction may be
established. For example, a state has personal jurisdiction when service of a
summons and complaint on an out-of-state defendant occurs within the ju-
risdictional boundaries of the state (also known as “tag jurisdiction”).60
Also, a defendant may consent to the personal jurisdiction of a state even
though the state does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.61
While there are many possible ways for a forum state to gain personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, there remains a large swath of
cases that lack the requisite “minimum contacts” such that notions of “fair
play and substantial justice” are met when a court tries to exercise personal
jurisdiction.62
The hypothetical mentioned at the end of the Hughs case serves as a
telling reminder that questions of personal jurisdiction have real-world im-
plications. Would a court be able to exercise jurisdiction when domestic
violence occurs in Pennsylvania and the victim then flees to Minnesota to
seek shelter from the violence? In this instance, if the alleged abuser has no
contacts with Minnesota and does not threaten the victim in Minnesota,
Minnesota generally has no personal jurisdiction over the alleged abuser. In
response to this problem, two competing legal theories have developed.63
First, the majority of states have held that personal jurisdiction is not re-
quired for entering an OFP. These states, however, differ on precisely how
this is possible with some states ruling that OFPs can be entered via the
status exception, and others ruling that OFPs can be entered because they
only grant prohibitory relief. On the contrary, a minority of states have
found that interstate domestic violence cases do require personal jurisdic-
tion because an OFP is a judgment that imposes an affirmative obligation in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. However, before conducting
a more in-depth analysis of the reasoning behind the majority and minority
views, it is imperative to further discuss the status exception and its applica-
tion in other areas of family law.
59. See, e.g., MINN. STAT § 543.19, subd. 1(4) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045
(2016). The effects test analysis has been employed in several cases involving domestic violence.
See, e.g., Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole, 572 N.W.2d 747, 751 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Becker v.
Johnson, 937 So. 2d 1128, 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
60. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
61. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982).
62. See cases cited supra note 36.
63. There are arguably three competing theories, which will later be discussed infra Section
II.C.
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B. The Historical Context of the Status Exception
The jurisprudence behind the status exception was first created in the
Supreme Court case Pennoyer v. Neff.64 In Pennoyer, the Court noted, “the
State, for example, has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon
which the marriage relation between its citizens shall be created, and the
cause of which it might be dissolved.”65 Thus, the Supreme Court clarified
that marriage was a state creation that the state had the sovereignty to de-
fine, control, and dissolve.
The Supreme Court further applied this theory in Williams v. State of
North Carolina,66 holding that states must give full faith and credit to a
divorce judgment even if the divorce decree in question was entered with-
out personal jurisdiction over the defendant.67 However, the judgment may
consist only of dissolving the bonds of matrimony and cannot impose af-
firmative relief such as property division or alimony.68 While the Supreme
Court has not explicitly addressed the status exception for custody cases,
the UCCJEA recognizes that child custody determinations are also status
determinations.69
The authors of the UCCJEA, along with the Parental Kidnapping Pre-
vention Act (“PKPA”) and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(“UCCJA”), noted that the basis for the determination that child custody is
not required can be found in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in May v.
Anderson, in which he clarifies that the Wisconsin court did have jurisdic-
tion to decide custody without having personal jurisdiction over one of the
parents.70 As observed by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Frankfurter’s concur-
rence has generally been seen as the controlling part of the opinion because
his vote was necessary for the ultimate outcome of the case and his analysis
was within the issue explained by the court.71
64. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
65. Id. at 734–737.
66. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
67. Id. at 311.
68. Id. at 309.
69. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENF’T ACT § 201, cmt. 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1997).
70. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 535–536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see
also UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENF’T ACT § 201, cmt. 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997)
(explaining that the authors of the UCCJEA relied on Frankfurter’s concurrence in May v. Ander-
son, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) while establishing the requirements of the emergency-jurisdiction provi-
sion of section 201 of the UCCJEA).
71. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L.
REV. 379, 385 (1959).
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C. The Majority’s View Regarding the Status Exception and Prohibitive
Relief as Applied to OFPs
The majority of states who have addressed this issue have concluded
that personal jurisdiction is not necessary to enter an OFP.72 These states,
however, have two different tracks of reasoning that have led them to their
respective conclusions. First, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the status
exception to personal jurisdiction also applies in OFP cases because the
petitioner is seeking a new status in relation to the respondent.73 Second,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey and the Kentucky Court of Appeals both
determined that their respective courts could enter an order that granted
exclusively prohibitive relief, as long as the relief did not impose an affirm-
ative obligation.74 Lastly, the Massachusetts and New Hampshire Supreme
Courts merge both of these lines of reasoning to create a hybrid position
that finds justification for entering an order via the status exception, but
clarifies that every OFP must grant only prohibitive relief to comport with
due process.75
The prohibitive relief that the majority refers to can be described as an
order restricting the defendant from such things including having contact
with the victim; abusing the victim; and coming within a certain distance of
the victim’s residence, work, family members, etc. This is distinguishable
from affirmative obligations which include: restrictions on future firearm
purchases; the surrender of firearms the defendant may have in their posses-
sion; counseling or psychologist evaluations; abuse or anger management
classes; temporary child support; and payment of costs and expense, etc.
While prohibitive relief still does affect the defendant’s rights, the majority
of states determined that this relief does not go any further than status deter-
minations in marriage or custody cases.76
1. Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa 2001)
In 2001, the Supreme Court of Iowa, in a four to three decision, be-
came the first court of last resort to decide that personal jurisdiction was not
required to enter an OFP in an interstate domestic violence case.77 In com-
ing to their conclusion, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed a district court
ruling finding that under Iowa Code Section 236.4, personal jurisdiction
72. These states include: Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Jersey.
73. See Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 10 (Iowa 2001).
74. See Shah v. Shah, 875 A.2d 931, 940–942 (N.J. 2005).
75. See Hemenway v. Hemenway, 992 A.2d 575, 581–582 (N.H. 2010); Caplan v. Donovan,
879 N.E.2d 117, 124–125 (Mass. 2008); Spencer v. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Ky. Ct. App.
2006).
76. See, e.g., Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 10 (“If a court may constitutionally make orders affect-
ing marriage, custody, and parental rights without personal jurisdiction of a defendant, it certainly
should be able to do what the court did [below]—enter an order protecting a resident Iowa family
from abuse.”).
77. See id.
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was not needed because the OFP “only preserved the protected status” of
the plaintiff.78
In coming to this conclusion, the court noted that there have been other
instances in the law where the United States Supreme Court and uniform
laws have determined that personal jurisdiction is not required to satisfy due
process under the law.79 These areas, including child custody and dissolu-
tions, are reasoned to be adjudications to simply determine the parties’ rela-
tionship status, for example, husband-wife, or custodial parent-child. The
court in Bartsch, by using the status exception, concluded that the status of
a protected person is analogous to the aforementioned statuses.80
Bartsch also relied heavily on the public-policy implications associ-
ated with domestic violence compared to those of dissolutions and custody
cases, as the risk of personal harm or death outweighed interests typically
used to justify the status exception in other areas of family law.81 However,
while personal jurisdiction was determined to be moot because of the status
exception, the Bartsch court did find that other due-process requirements
need to be met.82 These due-process requirements include giving the defen-
dant notice and a reasonable opportunity to defend against the entering of
an OFP.83
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Iowa Supreme Court
concluded that OFPs do not act to take any affirmative rights away from the
alleged abuser, as the order simply specified the defendant to “‘stay away
from the protected party’ and not assault or communicate with her.”84
Justice Carter, along with two other members of the Iowa Supreme
Court, dissented and said that the petitioner, in this case, did not come to the
district court for a status adjudication but rather for injunctive relief.85 In
addition, the dissenting opinion points out that even if this was a status
adjudication, the Fourteenth Amendment limits foreign courts from entering
a judgment “affecting the rights or interests of a nonresident defendant.”86
Here, the court not only directly invaded the defendant’s “liberty interest”
but imposed collateral consequences of a lasting nature, which included his
ability to purchase or own firearms under federal law.87
78. Id.
79. See id. at 7–10.
80. Id.
81. “The greater and more immediate risk of harm from domestic violence, as opposed to the
‘considerable interest in preventing bigamous marriages and in protecting the offspring in mar-
riages from being [illegitimate]’ . . . makes application of the status exception to protective orders
even more compelling than in dissolution actions.” Id. at 9.
82. 636 N.W.2d at 9.
83. “It is true that due process requires, in status determinations as well as others, reasonable
attempts to notify the defendant and a reasonable opportunity to defend.” Id.
84. Id. at 10.
85. Id. at 11 (Carter, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 12.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-2\UST213.txt unknown Seq: 12 10-MAY-18 16:33
2018] STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND PROTECTED STATUS 541
2. Shah v. Shah, 875 A.2d 931 (N.J. 2005)
In 2005, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Shah v. Shah ordered that a
final OFP could not be issued because there was a lack of personal jurisdic-
tion, but that a temporary restraining order could be issued, so long as it
exclusively granted prohibitory relief and imposed no affirmative obliga-
tion.88 Furthermore, under New Jersey Statutes Annotated 2C:25-28i, the
Court held that the temporary order should remain in effect until the trial
court issued a further order.89 Thus, ensuring that while a final order could
not be entered without personal jurisdiction, the victim would at least have
an indefinite temporary order until a court with personal jurisdiction could
either grant or deny a final OFP.
The Shah court came to this conclusion by distinguishing between
“prohibitory orders that serve to protect the domestic violence victim, and
affirmative orders that require that a defendant undertake [some] action.”90
The court saw this distinction in the fact that prohibitive orders are meant to
address protection for the victim and simply prohibits behavior by the de-
fendant that is already illegal.91 While the court does not go as far as adopt-
ing the reasoning in Bartsch, it does create a carve-out to personal
jurisdiction by distinguishing already illegal acts as not infringing on any
substantive rights of the defendant.92
The Shah court granted a temporary order on the basis of prohibitive
relief but also concluded that due to the affirmative requirements of enter-
ing a final OFP, the court did not have authority to issue a final order.93 In
addition, the court found that the issuance of a final order might also in-
clude several collateral consequences including registration in a central reg-
istry.94 However, since these affirmative obligations are placed on the
defendant only when a final order is entered, the court elected to balance the
plaintiff’s need for protection with the defendant’s due process rights by
sustaining a temporary OFP indefinitely.95
The defendant did contest the “indefinite” temporary order as also hav-
ing collateral consequences.96 The Shah court responded to this concern by
noting that the defendant is not prejudiced by an order that requires him to
88. 875 A.2d 931, 942 (N.J. 2005).
89. Temporary OFPs are typically very short in duration; however, by finding that a tempo-
rary order in New Jersey could go on indefinitely, the Shah court found another way to protect
interstate victims of domestic violence. See id. at 942.
90. Id. at 939.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Shah, 875 A.2d at 940 (“A final restraining order must, by statutory definition, in-
clude affirmative relief. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. § 2C:25-29b (requiring the surrender of firearms and
permits), -29.1 (requiring the payment of a civil penalty) and -29.4 (requiring the payment of a
surcharge).”).
94. Id.
95. See id. at 942.
96. See id. at 941.
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do absolutely nothing.97 Furthermore, the court reverted to additional lan-
guage contained in the New Jersey Domestic Violence Act, which allows
an ex parte order to remain in effect until a further order is issued.98
In conclusion, the Shah court declined to extend the “status” reasoning
in Bartsch, and in fact, did not make any citation to the Bartsch opinion.99
However, Shah did acknowledge the legislature’s intention to protect vic-
tims of domestic violence from continuing domestic violence where they
are “sheltered,” and thus determined that relying solely on the distinction
between affirmative and prohibitory relief was the correct path for interstate
domestic violence cases.100
3. Spencer v. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006)
In 2006, the Kentucky Court of Appeals elected to affirm a trial court’s
decision to enter an OFP without personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant.101 This decision did not formally adopt the reasoning of the sta-
tus determination in Bartsch, but instead found legitimacy in Kentucky’s
safe harbor rule:
Any family member or member of an unmarried couple who
is a resident of this state or has fled to this state to escape domes-
tic violence and abuse may file a verified petition in the District
Court of the county in which he resides. If the petitioner has left
his usual place of residence within this state in order to avoid
domestic violence and abuse, the petition may be filed and pro-
ceedings held in the county of his usual residence or in the Dis-
trict Court in the county of current residence.102
In clarifying the exact parameters of the safe harbor rule in Kentucky,
the Spencer court examined the published case law from other jurisdictions
that examined interstate domestic violence cases. The court first analyzed In
re T.L v. W.L.103 where a Delaware court ruled against issuing an OFP in a
similar factual circumstance.104 The Spencer court reasoned that the adverse
ruling to the petitioner was because the petitioner in T.L. was not a resident
for purposes of Delaware’s Domestic Abuse Act.105 The Spencer court also
examined the reasoning in Bartsch, as well as the reasoning of Shah, and
97. Id. at 940–941 (“[H]e can either come into New Jersey and substantively defend against
the domestic violence complaint, or he can request that both matter [his dissolution in Illinois and
this order for protection] be heard in Illinois[.]”).
98. Id. at 942 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28i (2017)). This is a relatively unusual provi-
sion in a state’s domestic violence act, as most expire after a relatively short period of time.
99. Shah, 875 A.2d at 942 n.5.
100. See id. at 942.
101. Spencer v. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14, 17 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
102. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.725(1) (1996).
103. 820 A.2d 506 (Del. 2003) (discussed infra Section II.D.1).
104. Id. at 515–516. The facts in T.L. are very similar to the facts in Spencer.
105. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d at 17–18.
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ultimately concluded that there is a recognizable distinction between a “pro-
hibitory protective order” and an order that purports to impose affirmative
obligations on the defendant.106 This distinction prompted the Spencer court
to conclude that Shah represented the fairest balance in interstate domestic
violence cases.107
In recognizing that the Kentucky legislature clearly meant to extend
protection to out-of-state victims fleeing to Kentucky for safety, the Spen-
cer court concluded that residency status is not required.108 In adopting
Shah’s distinction between prohibitive and affirmative relief, the Spencer
court allowed the entering of a permanent order,109 but only so far as “the
order prohibits Ken from breaking the law in Kentucky by approaching Ava
or Morgan.”110
4. Caplan v. Donovan, 879 N.E.2d 117 (Mass. 2008)
In 2008, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Caplan, de-
cided to adopt the reasoning in Bartsch in holding that Massachusetts had
the authority to enter an OFP based on the status of the petitioner.111 The
Caplan court first looked at the various ways to establish personal jurisdic-
tion. They noted that Massachusetts has a similar statute to the Minnesota
statute, examined in Hughs, which extends personal jurisdiction to a non-
resident defendant if a tortious injury is caused in the state.112 However, the
Caplan court affirmed the trial court’s decision that phone calls by the al-
leged abuser into Massachusetts did not amount to a tortious injury in the
state of Massachusetts.113 After determining that long-arm jurisdiction was
not possible, Caplan nonetheless concluded that the status exception was
applicable.114 In making this determination, the court relied heavily on the
Bartsch decision to conclude that the OFP “serves a role analogous to a
custody or marital determination” except the Caplan court noted that the
order “focuses on the plaintiff’s protected status rather than her marital or
parental status.”115
The Caplan court also addressed a public-policy argument seen in
Bartsch regarding the overall interest a state has in protecting victims from
106. Id. at 18.
107. Id. at 19.
108. Id. at 17.
109. While adopting the reasoning in Shah, the court does not indicate that a final order would
violate due process but rather states that: “In all other respects [besides prohibiting the defendant
from breaking the law in Kentucky], [the order] goes beyond the permissible limits of Kentucky
courts’ jurisdiction.” Id. at 19.
110. Id.
111. Caplan v. Donovan, 879 N.E.2d 117, 124–125 (Mass. 2008).
112. Id. at 125 n.5.
113. Id. at 121.
114. See id. at 122–123.
115. Id. at 123.
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additional physical and emotional abuse.116 However, they chose to ex-
amine this problem by illustrating an “unpalatable decision” a victim would
have if the court did not issue an OFP:
The choices remaining are either to require the victim of
abuse to return to the State in which the abuse occurred in order
to obtain an effective abuse prevention order or, alternatively,
wait for the abuser to follow the victim to the Commonwealth
and, in the event of a new incident of abuse, seek an order from a
Massachusetts court [at that time].117
The Caplan court’s heavy reliance on this policy consideration stems
from the fact that in neither of the outlined choices above is the court able
to protect a resident within its own borders.
In the end, the Caplan court found that Massachusetts has long held
that an order appropriately limited to prohibitions related to the protected
status of a person within the Commonwealth does not violate the due-pro-
cess rights of a nonresident defendant just because the court has no personal
jurisdiction over that defendant.118 This is true, in the instance of domestic
violence, as long as the defendant has notice and an opportunity to be heard,
and the order does not impose affirmative obligations.119
5. Hemenway v. Hemenway, 992 A.2d 575 (N.H. 2010)
In the 2010 case of Hemenway v. Hemenway, the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court held that, while there was no personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, the trial court could issue an OFP if it granted only prohibitory
relief. The court concluded that both Williams v. North Carolina and Pen-
noyer v. Neff stand for the proposition that a state may adjudicate matters
involving the status of relationships without personal jurisdiction over the
defendants.120 In addition, the court resolved that prohibiting continuing
abuse and ordering no contact is analogous to custody or marital determina-
tions, and the status argument could sufficiently be extended to interstate
domestic violence cases.121
Similar to the courts before Hemenway, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court chose only to enforce the parts of the OFP, which concerned prohibi-
tive relief, and disallowed any relief imposing affirmative obligations on the
defendant.122 Further, since New Hampshire has a “strong interest in pro-
116. Id. at 123. (“Such an order furthers the Commonwealth’s important public policy goal of
securing ‘the fundamental human right to be protected from the devastating impact of family
violence.’”).
117. Caplan, 879 N.E.2d at 123.
118. Id. at 125.
119. See id. at 124–125.
120. Hemenway, 992 A.2d at 581–582.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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viding protection to victims of domestic violence,” the court saw the parts
of the trial court’s order dealing with prohibitive relief as consistent with
due process under the United States Constitution.123
D. A Minority of States Have Concluded That Personal Jurisdiction is
Required to Enter a Valid OFP
1. In re T.L. v. W.L., 820 A.2d 506 (Del. 2003)
In 2003, the Family Court of Delaware, Sussex County, became the
second court to hear an interstate domestic violence case.124 The court, in
T.L., established its concerns regarding entering an OFP without personal
jurisdiction.125 First, noting that Cohen v. Cohen allowed for the status ex-
ception to personal jurisdiction under Delaware law.126 The court, however,
found that the Delaware Supreme Court precedent in Cohen placed a re-
quirement of “bona fide residency in the state,” when using a status deter-
mination in the context of a dissolution.127 In T.L., the court noted that the
plaintiff fled Ohio for Delaware and after two days in the state of Delaware
applied for an OFP.128 Due to the short time frame, T.L. was not a “bona
fide resident” under Cohen.129 In addition, since Delaware had no “safe
harbor rule” like Kentucky, the court believed the divorce requirements of
bona fide residency established in Cohen should transfer to OFPs.130
Second, the court noted that there were absolutely no contacts except
for the presence of the plaintiff in Delaware.131 Under these facts, the court
found that the “husband’s rights of due process vastly outweigh the state’s
legitimate concerns to protect its residents from domestic violence.”132
The court did acknowledge that the Iowa Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Bartsch would seem to allow adjudication without personal jurisdic-
tion.133 However, the Court found T.L. and Bartsch distinguishable, as Tara
Bartsch filed for an OFP a month after residing in Iowa.134 In addition,
since the abuse in Bartsch transpired in Utah (a state in which neither of the
parties then resided in) the case proceeding in Iowa seemed more reasona-
ble.135 Lastly, the court pointed to the close four to three decision and the
123. See id.
124. See In re T.L. v. W.L., 820 A.2d 506, 506 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2003).
125. See id.
126. Id. at 512.
127. Id. at 512–513.
128. Id. at 514.
129. See id.
130. In re T.L., 820 A.2d at 514.
131. Id. at 514. This finding indicates that the husband did not have enough minimum contacts
in the State of Delaware.
132. Id. at 516.
133. See id. at 514–515.
134. Id. at 514.
135. Id. at 515.
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chief justice’s dissent as support that the husband’s due-process rights were
more significant than the need to enter an OFP.136
The court also discussed the permissible reach of the Delaware long-
arm statute juxtaposed to the interpretation of the Minnesota long-arm stat-
ute by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Hughs.137 While Minnesota’s
long-arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction if an act outside of Min-
nesota causes harm within Minnesota, Delaware is limited to situations
where the act causes harm outside of the state, and is specific to “business,
derivation of revenue, or use or consumption of items.”138
In conclusion, the T.L. court found that the OFP was improperly en-
tered because T.L. was not a resident of the state and the respondent did not
have sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Delaware.139 In other
words, the Delaware trial court specially rejected the applicability of the
status exception to interstate domestic violence cases and noted that
“[a]lthough the State of Delaware clearly has an important interest in foster-
ing the protection against domestic abuse, its power to do so should be
tempered to be sure that it is serving bona fide residents and not extending
protective Orders against persons lacking requisite minimum contacts with
the state.”140
2. Becker v. Johnson, 937 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. Ct. App.  2006)
In 2006, the Florida District Court of Appeals decided an appeal from
a Florida District Court granting the plaintiff an OFP against her alleged
abuser.141 The main issue at stake was whether the defendant’s threatening
phone calls made to the plaintiff while she was in the State of Florida gave
the Florida court long-arm jurisdiction over the defendant.142
The Court pegged its analysis on an affidavit the defendant admitted
into evidence stating that he had no knowledge that the plaintiff was resid-
ing in Florida at the time he had left threatening voicemails.143 The burden
of proving that the defendant did know the plaintiff was residing in Florida
then shifted to the plaintiff. While the plaintiff argued that the defendant
had reason to know she was seeking refuge in Florida, no affidavit to this
point was filed.144 Thus, the court of appeals reversed the grant of an OFP
for want of personal jurisdiction.145
136. In re T.L., 820 A.2d at 515.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 515.
139. See id. at 515–516.
140. Id. at 516.
141. Becker v. Johnson, 937 So. 2d 1128, 1129–1130 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006).
142. Id. at 1129.
143. Id. at 1131.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1132.
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Noticeably, the court left out any discussion about the status exception
to personal jurisdiction as discussed in Bartsch and Shah. In addition, it
declined to analyze whether personal jurisdiction might be established
through the harm that was occurring in Florida based on the alleged abuse
that transpired in Maryland, which is the state the victim was residing in
before fleeing to Florida.146
3. Fox v. Fox, 106 A.3d 919 (Vt. 2014)
In 2014, the Vermont Supreme Court became the first court of last
resort to decline to affirm a decision for a temporary or final OFP without
personal jurisdiction.147 In its opinion, the Fox court, while acknowledging
the distinction between the status exception argument and prohibitive/af-
firmative relief argument, reasoned that both theories ultimately fail.148
Relying on the reasoning of Chief Justice Carter in his dissent in
Bartsch, the Fox court concluded that—regardless of how you limit the
OFP—it will always have significant implications for a defendant’s sub-
stantive rights.149 In coming to this conclusion, the court looked at the Shah
court’s conclusion that “an order that merely directs a defendant to stay
away from and not contact a plaintiff does not actually impose a personal
obligation,” and the OFP simply “prohibits the defendant from engaging in
behavior already specifically outlawed . . . [it] does not implicate any of the
defendant’s substantive rights.”150 The issue for the Fox court was whether
an order prohibiting contact within a certain number of feet and disallowing
travel to certain places does, in fact, prohibit more than specific behavior
that is already outlawed.151 In addition, the court also noted that the issu-
ance of an order opens the defendant up to many potential criminal charges
for violations of the order and very well may have collateral
consequences.152
The court noted that, after the issuance of an OFP, the defendant’s
potentially illegal but also legal conduct is restrained, and thus by exten-
sion, so is his liberty.153 The court added that such restraints may not only
be appropriate but also necessary, however, since OFPs restrain normally
permissible behavior, all OFPs go beyond strictly prohibitive relief and
therefore impose relief beyond that which is already illegal.154
146. Id.
147. See Fox v. Fox, 106 A.3d 919, 921 (Vt. 2014).
148. Id. at 926–927.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 926 (quoting Shah v. Shah, 875 A.2d 931, 939 (N.J. 2005)).
151. Id.
152. Id.; see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2262(b) (2013) (penalties for traveling interstate with the
intention to violate a protection order); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2015) (making the purchase or
possession of firearms illegal for a person who is subject to a qualified OFP).
153. Fox, 106 A.3d at 926.
154. Id.
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While the Fox court recognized the “unpalatable choices” referenced
in Caplan, they also recognized an unpalatable choice for the alleged
abuser:
[A] Vermonter with no connection to, for example, Califor-
nia could be forced to choose between traveling from Vermont to
California to defend against civil charges of domestic violence
and accepting the consequences of a judicial finding of abuse and
an abuse-prevention order in California because an alleged victim
of domestic violence chose to relocate to California. Such a sce-
nario challenges “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice” protected by the personal jurisdiction requirement pursu-
ant to the Due Process Clause.155
In conclusion, the Fox court declined to carve out an exception based
on the status exception or the grant of only prohibitive relief in interstate
domestic violence cases because it reasoned that all OFPs impose affirma-
tive relief regardless of how narrowly they are tailored.156 Several months
after the opinion was handed down, the plaintiff petitioned the Supreme
Court of the United States for review.157 But, in early 2015, the Supreme
Court denied the petitioner’s writ of certiorari, thus settling the dispute as to
Vermont’s treatment of personal jurisdiction requirements in interstate do-
mestic violence cases.158
III. AN ANALYSIS OF BOTH THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY POSITIONS
This Part details various considerations with both the majority and mi-
nority positions on interstate domestic violence cases. First, this Part ex-
plains why the majority position on the status exception’s applicability to
interstate domestic violence cases is correct. Second, this Part explains the
problems with the majority’s and minority’s respective positions when it
comes to prohibitive relief. Mainly, this Part details the incompatibly of the
Fox court’s position on the infringement of substantive rights as compared
to other areas of family law that use the status exception. This Part also
details the problem with the majority position on the infringement of certain
rights that should not be categorized as prohibitory relief.
A. Why the Majority Position on the Status Exception is Correct
During the past decades, the status exception has allowed states across
the country to address certain family law related issues that are essential to
their citizenry. In fact, the status exception began with the very fundamental
understanding that states have the sovereignty to declare and dissolve cer-
155. Id. at 927.
156. Id.
157. Petition for a writ of certiorari, Fox v. Fox, 135 S. Ct. 952 (2015) (No. 14-435), 2014 WL
5282098.
158. Fox, 106 A.3d at 919.
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tain relationships within their own borders.159 While the status exception
originally started in the area of marital dissolutions,160 it has since been
expended into the areas of child custody and adoption because of the recog-
nition of states’ strong interest in familial relationships and establishing the
obligations and rights that flow from these relationships.161
In this same vein, state courts have an arguably greater interest in pro-
tecting victims from domestic violence than they do for the interests com-
monly cited in support of the status exception in other areas of family law.
For example, the states’ interest in protecting victims of domestic violence
is presumed to be greater than its interest in preventing bigamous marriages
and offspring from becoming illegitimate.162  In addition, the states’ interest
of determining child custody through the UCCJEA is also arguably of simi-
lar—if not less—importance to protecting its citizens from domestic
abuse.163
The status argument in the domestic violence realm serves a similar
purpose and is conceptually similar to the examples cited above. However,
unlike marital or custody determinations, the status exception in interstate
domestic violence cases focuses on the status of the petitioner as a pro-
tected person rather than the petitioner’s status as a custodial parent or sin-
gle person. As the Iowa Supreme Court acknowledged in Bartsch, “[i]f a
court may constitutionally make orders affecting marriage, custody, and pa-
rental rights without personal jurisdiction of a defendant, it certainly should
be able to . . . enter an order protecting a resident . . . from abuse.”164
In distinguishing the other areas of family law that allow status deter-
minations to proceed without personal jurisdiction, one commentator has
argued that OFPs do not act as true status determinations because they do
not actually alter the relationship status of the victim and abuser.165 Bevin
Graybill argues that the majority in Bartsch failed to support their holding
that Tara Bartsch’s OFP was a recognized declaration on the status of the
relationship between her and her former paramour.166 Rather, Graybill ar-
gues that the relationship is altered in the same way when a “court enjoins
one farmer from tilling the land of a neighboring farmer.”167 Thus, she con-
159. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
160. Id. at 734–735.
161. See, e.g., UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENF’T ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997).
162. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (citing the prevention of bigamous marriages
and the protection of offspring from being illegitimate as reasons for the status exception in the
context of marital dissolutions).
163. This status exception, which at its core affects a parent’s fundamental right to parent their
child, is recognized in part because of the state’s interest in the protection of children within its
borders. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENF’T ACT § 201(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1997).
164. Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 10 (Iowa 2001).
165. Graybill, supra note 45, at 856.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 858.
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cludes that an OFP acts as a civil injunction to enjoin the defendant from
abusing, contacting, or approaching the victim.168
Graybill’s argument does not appreciate how the change in status oper-
ates because an OFP does operate to change the way the two parties are
legally able to interact with each other going forward. An analogous exam-
ple is in the operation of the UCCJEA. The UCCJEA, as mentioned earlier,
does not require personal jurisdiction.169 Besides the lack of a personal ju-
risdiction requirement, custody adjudications are also interesting—as com-
pared to OFPs—because they do not necessarily change the “legal”
relationship of parties, as both parents could still be considered the parents
of the minor child at issue after an adjudication under the UCCJEA. For
example, a custody order under the UCCJEA’s emergency custody provi-
sion allows a court to apply its own state law and change a whole host of
potential conditions on one or both of the parents, such as requiring super-
vised parenting time or altering parenting time.170 The state’s power to ef-
fectuate this type of change necessarily leaves the door open for a drastic
modification in the parties’ rights and obligations within the parent-child
relationship. But, like interstate domestic violence cases, UCCJEA adjudi-
cations only impact the way the parties are able to legally interact with their
child (the subject of the custody order). To distinguish the two based on the
fact that the parent-child relationship is more of a legal relationship is also
incorrect if the following assertion is that victims of domestic violence
often have no legal relationship with their former partner. This may be true
in the technical sense, if the parties were never married and never had a
child in common, yet the law in many states does recognize this distinction
as they specifically allow a petitioner to bring a petition against someone
they either lived with, had a sexual relationship with, or had a romantic
relationship with.171
Simply put, an OFP is an applicable form of status adjudication be-
cause it adjudicates the status of the relationship between the victim and
alleged abuser. Like a determination under the UCCJEA, a properly tailored
OFP does not offer judgment against the respondent, but rather adjudicates
the status of the petitioner by declaring their right to be free from abusive
behavior. Just like an OFP, custody orders disallow the other party from
engaging in certain behaviors, such as taking custody of the minor child
when the order does not allow for such custody. In both instances, the or-
ders are not allowed to require that the respondent engage in an affirmative
168. Id.
169. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENF’T ACT § 201(c), cmt. 2 (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1997); see also, e.g., In re Paternity of Robinaugh, 616 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ind. Ct. App.
1993) (“Custody proceedings are adjudications of status.”).
170. See MINN. STAT. § 518D.204 (2016).
171. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subds. 2(b)(4), (7); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6301 (2015);
IOWA CODE ANN § 236.2 (2017).
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act, such as paying child support, requiring counseling and psychological
services, or surrendering firearms.172 However, this new status declaration
does and can, in both instances, command the respondent to refrain from
certain acts. In sum, the only truly distinguishing factor between a custody
order under the UCCJEA entered without personal jurisdiction and an OFP
entered without personal jurisdiction are the actual prohibitions that the or-
der addresses.173
It is without question that states “may exercise jurisdiction to establish
or terminate a status if the status has a sufficient relationship to the
state.”174 In the instance of an OFP ordered under the status exception,
states exercise their jurisdiction to establish a status (the petitioner as a pro-
tected person), and this status determination has a sufficient relationship to
the state as the petitioner is a resident of the state and is in need of the
state’s protection. Graybill also asserts that the common types of relation-
ships adjudicated under Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws Sec-
tions 70–79 implicitly concludes that domestic violence is inapplicable to
the status exception because OFPs are not included in the typical examples
of types of family law relationships that may be adjudicated via the status
exception.175  Even so, it is not surprising that interstate domestic violence
cases are not mentioned, as OFPs themselves are a recent development.
In conclusion, the status argument in the interstate domestic violence
context is backed by many of the same fundamental policy and practical
reasons behind divisible divorce and interstate child custody. It allows the
state to exercise its inherent authority over its citizens to declare and protect
them under legal statuses established by the state. Since the advent of do-
mestic violence laws in the 1970s and 1980s, individual states have recog-
nized the legal status of victims of domestic violence by creating an avenue
for victims to protect themselves through an adjudication declaring them a
protected person.176 The status exception to personal jurisdiction was cre-
ated specifically in the context of family law, an area long held to be in the
province of the state, and it is equally applicable regardless of whether the
172. See, e.g., In re NC, 294 P.3d 866, 877 (Wyo. 2013) (striking down provisions of the
district court’s order that extend beyond relief that the UCCJEA allows).
173. Whereas an OFP may say “do not contact the petitioner,” and a custody order may state,
“do not violate the terms of this court-ordered parenting schedule.”
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (emphasis added).
175. Graybill, supra note 45, at 857; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 70–79 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (relationships in which the state may establish or terminate a
status include: divorce, adoption, and child custody).
176. A noticeable change from Colonial America where women were viewed a property, and a
man was allowed to beat his wife so long as he used “a rod no thicker than his thumb.” Jessica
Carrie Clingan, Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales: The Value of A Restraining Order, 10 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 332 (2007) (citing Marion Wanless, Mandatory Arrest: A Step To-
ward Eradicating Domestic Violence, but is it Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 535–536
(1996)).
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status declaration is that of a marital relationship, parent-child relationship,
or victim-abuser relationship.
B. The Problem with the Majority Position on Prohibitive Relief/
Affirmative Relief
As discussed earlier, the arguments pertaining to the status exception
and prohibitive/affirmative relief are distinct but necessarily intertwined be-
cause use of the status exception requires that no affirmative obligations are
imposed.177 While it is the author’s opinion that the OFPs do create a new
legal status and are applicable under the status exception to personal juris-
diction, there remains a distinct problem. Currently, many OFPs issued in
courts that have recognized the status exception likely impose affirmative
obligations and overly invasive collateral consequences.178 These obliga-
tions and consequences must be addressed so that OFPs entered without
personal jurisdiction are constitutionally sound under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In distinguishing the other areas of family law, which allow status de-
terminations to proceed without personal jurisdiction, courts and commen-
tators have argued that OFPs alter a respondent’s substantive rights in a
way that marital and custody status determinations do not.179 Whether an
individual state’s OFP may impose a particular affirmative obligation on a
respondent can be found in either the state’s specific domestic abuse act or
under federal law.
1. The Impact on Substantive Rights and Collateral Consequences
from an OFP
In beginning this section, it is important first to define several terms
that are used regularly by courts that have dealt with personal jurisdiction
requirements for out-of-state defendants. First, prohibitive relief in the do-
mestic violence context is relief that prohibits certain conduct by the re-
spondent. Many courts view prohibitive relief as not directly attacking a
respondent’s substantive rights because this prohibitive relief simply pro-
hibits behavior that is already specifically outlawed, such as abusing or
harassing the victim.180 On the other hand, an affirmative obligation181 is
defined as requiring the respondent to undertake some action.182 Affirma-
177. All cases deciding this issue have either discussed both issues or merged both issues. See
infra notes 77–123.
178. See, e.g., Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 11–12 (Iowa 2011) (Carter, J., dissenting).
179. See id.; Fox v. Fox, 106 A.3d 919, 926–927 (Vt. 2014); Graybill, supra note 45, at 860.
180. See, e.g., Shah v. Shah, 875 A.2d 931, 939 (N.J. 2005); Spencer v. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d
14, 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006) (“Insofar as the order prohibits Ken from breaking the law in Ken-
tucky by approaching Ava or Morgan, it comports with due process.”).
181. An affirmative obligation is also referred to as affirmative relief.
182. See Shah, 875 A.2d at 939.
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tive obligations, which meet the former definition, have rightly been ex-
cluded from every court’s analysis under the status exception because
Kulko v. Superior Court makes clear that the state cannot award affirmative
relief without personal jurisdiction over a defendant.183 In short,
[j]urisdiction to establish or terminate a status should be distin-
guishable from jurisdiction to determine the existence of a status
as an incidental question in litigation whose primary objective is
resolution of some other controversy . . . it should also be distin-
guished from jurisdiction to enforce liability arising from a status,
for example child support.184
Lastly, collateral consequences in the domestic violence context are
defined as additional penalties, disabilities, or disadvantages, which attach
to an OFP but are not explicitly ordered by the judge.185 The most common
type of collateral consequence generally associated with OFPs, which will
be discussed in Section B.III, is the prohibition of a respondent’s right to
possess and purchase firearms; however, there are potentially many others
which could attach depending on the state in which the OFP is entered.
In defense of prohibitory relief, courts that have employed the status
exception have reasoned that prohibitory relief does not affect a respon-
dent’s underlying substantive rights because it simply prohibits what is al-
ready illegal.186 Furthermore, as discussed later, a protection order that
prohibits abuse “serves a role that is analogous to custody or marital deter-
minations, except that the relief ordered focuses on the plaintiff’s protected
status rather than the plaintiff’s marital or parental status.”187 While this
proposition may be accurate for orders that simply prohibit the respondent
from abusing the petitioner, there remains a problem in classifying a re-
straint on contact and travel. This is because typically, OFPs will also order
the respondent to have no contact with the petitioner, as well as restrain the
respondent from coming within a certain distance of the petitioner.
While contact and distance requirements are certainly sound provi-
sions in OFPs, they do infringe on a respondent’s substantive rights. In fact,
but for the order in question, respondents would generally be able to contact
and come within any distance of the plaintiff.188 Thus, they do act as an
invasion of a respondent’s liberty interests, and outlaw much more than
what is simply illegal. This point was articulated by the Vermont Supreme
183. 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978).
184. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 11 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 1982)).
185. See Shah, 875 A.2d at 940 (an OFP in New Jersey has such collateral consequences as
registration in a central registry, etc.).
186. See, e.g., id. at 939 (prohibitory relief prohibits the defendant from engaging in behavior
already specifically outlawed).
187. Hemenway v. Hemenway, 992 A.2d 575, 581–582 (N.H. 2010) (citing Caplan v. Dono-
van, 879 N.E. 2d. 117, 123 (Mass. 2008)).
188. See Fox v. Fox, 106 A.3d 919, 926 (Vt. 2014).
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Court in its finding that personal jurisdiction is required to enter a valid
OFP.189
While it is important first to recognize that almost all OFPs do impose
more than a simple prohibition, this type of invasion of personal liberty is
found in every single area that allows a status determination since the status
exception was first established.190 Beginning with the divisible divorce doc-
trine, states have been allowed to declare an individual’s “status” in mar-
riage even without personal jurisdiction over one of the individuals
involved in that marriage.191 Courts after Williams made sure to include the
distinction between jurisdiction to establish or terminate a status and juris-
diction to enforce liability arising from a status, such as spousal mainte-
nance,192 property division,193 and child support.194 In all of these
examples, the courts would be imposing on the individual—whom they do
not have personal jurisdiction over—an obligation to act. This is in sharp
contrast to precluding them from doing something such as not contacting a
victim or not using a joint filing status on one’s taxes. Thus, it is not fair to
categorize these provisions as an imposition of an affirmative obligation, as
the Fox court does, by stating that these restrictions arise out of the enforce-
ment of a liability as opposed to a declaration of status.195
Simply put, all status adjudication involves the extinguishing of some
rights, which in turn can affect the defendant’s substantive rights. This is
true of divorce, which has enormous implications on tax deductions and tax
filing statuses.196 In addition, divorce disallows the entitlement of a surviv-
ing ex-spouse to seek damages in wrongful death cases,197 precludes intes-
tate inheritances,198 and disallows property rights such as joint tenancy in
the entirety.199 All of these infringements naturally flow from a divisible
divorce and have the potential to impact both spouses financially and per-
haps even socially, but yet are seen as valid consequences of a state’s inher-
ent right to declare a legal status of one of its residents.
189. Id. at 926–927.
190. See infra notes 196–202.
191. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298–299 (1942).
192. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 418 (1957) (holding that a court may not extinguish a
spouse’s right to alimony when the court does not have personal jurisdiction over the spouse).
193. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548 (1948) (concluding that a court must have personal
jurisdiction over both spouses to adjudicate property interests).
194. Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 101 (1978) (holding that a court may not
award child support against out-of-state defendant when there is no personal jurisdiction over the
out-of-state defendant).
195. See Fox v. Fox, 106 A.3d 919, 926 (Vt. 2014).
196. The Tax Consequences of Divorce, US TAX CENTER AT IRS.COM, https://www.irs.com/
articles/the-tax-consequences-of-divorce.
197. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 519 U.S. 248, 253 (1997).
198. See generally In re Estate of Anderson, 60 Cal. App. 4th 436, 70 Cal Rptr. 2d 266
(1997).
199. See, e.g., 765 ILCS 1005/1c (2016).
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The significant effect on substantive rights does not only stop at mar-
riage, but is also seen in custody, adoption, and child welfare proceedings.
For example, under the UCCJEA, a court without personal jurisdiction over
one of the parties may decide custodial rights.200 In the child welfare and
adoption context, the court may even go to the extreme lengths of com-
pletely terminating the full ambit of a parent’s rights vis-a`-vis their child.201
This equivalency stays true even in light of Troxel v. Granville, which held
that, “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has a substantive
component that . . . including parents’ fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”202  OFPs have
also been attacked in the past on the basis that they restrain the defendant’s
free speech rights and their right to free movement.203
i. Alleged Abusers Do Not Have a Right to Contact Their
Victims
While it is true that there is a deprivation of a liberty when an alleged
abuser is ordered to not contact a petitioner, an interstate OFP commanding
such is valid for several reasons. First, the restriction does not require the
defendant to affirmatively do anything, which is a hallmark of the status
exception. Second, it has long been the case that a person’s ability to speak
in certain instances can be reasonably constrained without almost any due
process. This idea has been articulated in cases such as Rowen v. United
States Post Office Department, where the United States Supreme Court up-
held the validity of a law that allowed a recipient of unwanted mail to ob-
tain a prohibitory order from the Postmaster General directing the sender to
stop sending mail to the recipient.204 This prohibitory order was sent with-
out a hearing or notice, but rather simply activated by the request of the
recipient.205 As the Supreme Court stated in Hill v. Colorado, the “privacy
interest in avoiding unwanted communication varies widely in different set-
tings. It is far less important when ‘strolling through Central Park’ than
200. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENF’T ACT § 109 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997);
Consford v. Consford, 271 A.D.2d 106, 110 (N.Y. 2000) (“[C]ustody determinations are status
adjudications not dependent upon personal jurisdiction over the parents.”).
201. See State ex rel. V.L.S., 935 So. 2d 389, 391 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/06); In re Adoption of
Copeland, 43 S.W.3d 483, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); J.D. v. Tuscaloosa Cty. Dep’t of Human
Res., 923 So. 2d 303, 311 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005); In re R.W., 39 A.3d 682, 700 (Vt. 2011).
202. 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000).
203. See, e.g., State v. Byzewski, 778 N.W.2d 551, 554 (N.D. 2010) (holding OFP did not
violate respondent’s right to travel, as he forfeited his right to travel to the petitioner’s home and
place of work by engaging in acts that led to the order); State v. Mott, 692 A.2d 360, 365 (Vt.
1997) (holding OFP did not violate defendant’s right to free speech because the Defendant has no
right to inflict unwanted and harassing conduct on another person).
204. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
205. Id.
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when ‘in the confines of one’s own home,’ or when persons are ‘powerless
to avoid’ it.”206
Most victims of domestic violence, like the mail recipients in Rowen,
wish to be left alone from harassment and abuse. While advertisers and
alleged abusers have a liberty to communicate, this communication is not
absolute as articulated by the captive audience doctrine.207 Dissenters may
distinguish the captive audience doctrine to apply in instances exclusively
seen in Rowen and its progeny, but this would be problematic for cases
involving domestic violence. Simply put, the type of relationship the victim
and alleged abuser had prior to the OFP provides justification for disregard-
ing the abuser’s right to communicate with the victim because the victim is
powerless to avoid unwanted communication by their abuser.208 As the
Court in Rowen articulated, “[i]f this prohibition operates to impede the
flow of even valid ideas, the answer is that no one has a right to press even
‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient.”209 In conclusion, any provision in
any OFP restricting the abuser’s right to contact the victim is valid regard-
less of whether the court issuing the order has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. This is not only true because the restraint may be warranted and
appropriate based on past behavior, but because the abuser does not have a
substantive right in further violating the sanctity of a victim who is power-
less to avoid unwanted communication from their abuser.
ii. Restrictions on a Respondent’s Movement Does Restrain a
Substantive Right
With regard to an OFP’s restriction on movement, OFPs commonly
contain a provision that forbids the defendant from coming within a certain
area of the petitioner for the duration of the order. Generally, every person
has the right to interstate travel210 and the freedom of movement.211 The
right to interstate travel has been construed to contain at least three main
components; however, the main component at issue in this context is the
right of a citizen of one state to enter and to leave another state.212 Yet, the
right to travel and the right to freedom of movement are not absolute and
may be validly restricted in many instances, including by a court that orders
206. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
21–22 (1971)).
207. See id. at 752.
208. See Samantha Allen, How Facebook Exposes Domestic Violence Survivors, DAILY BEAST
(May 20, 2015, 4:25 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-facebook-exposes-domestic-vio
lence-survivors (explaining that due to the hyper-connectedness of our society, it is harder now
more than ever to remain hidden from the public).
209. 397 U.S. at 738.
210. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630–631 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds
by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
211. Spence v. Kaminski, 12 P.3d 1036, 1036 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (the freedom of move-
ment under the first amendment is also a protected liberty interest).
212. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999).
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such a provision in an OFP.213 Compared to the ability to communicate
with a victim, the restrictions placed on travel and movement are recogniza-
ble infringements of substantive rights in the context of interstate OFPs.
While restricting the ability of a respondent to go places they normally
would be entitled to go is not an affirmative obligation, it still restrains a
defendant’s otherwise permissible conduct and a liberty interest they would
otherwise have.214 Because of this, restricting a defendant’s ability to travel
and go to certain places constitutes a direct invasion of a liberty interest.
Including such a provision in an interstate OFP would likely force some
courts to strike down this provision because it would have the effect of
restraining liberty by restricting some conduct that the defendant would oth-
erwise be able to engage in.215
iii. Conclusion
It is difficult to argue that the status exception as a whole does not, in
every instance, impact the underlying rights of the individuals involved.
Rather, almost a century of status-exception jurisprudence recognizes that
effects on substantive rights that do not qualify as affirmative conduct can
be both permissible and unavoidable. The status exception is, and always
was, meant to allow the states to define the critical familial relationships
within its borders out of a concern for the health and safety of its citi-
zenry.216 Its explicit call to not impose affirmative obligations on an out-of-
state defendant is a policy designed to respect other foreign citizens’ due
process rights, but this call was never meant to block all actions that could
have an effect on an out-of-state defendant’s underlying rights. For this rea-
son, states may validly include a no-contact provision in an interstate OFP.
However, a restriction on movement that encompasses public property does
affect a defendant’s underlying liberty interest in a more pronounced way,
which presents problems when including such a provision in an interstate
OFP. While there is no dispute that both may infringe to a minor degree on
an out-of-state defendant’s total and complete liberty, they do so no more
(and arguably much less) than the many other areas in family law we cur-
rently look to as valid exceptions to the personal jurisdiction requirement
under the Fourteenth Amendment.217
213. See, e.g., State v. Byzewski, 778 N.W.2d 551, 554 (N.D. 2010); see also Spence, 12 P.3d
at 1036.
214. Spence, 12 P.3d at 1036.
215. Assuming the restriction is not only a restriction on entering private property but also a
restriction on entering places of public accommodation.
216. See Hazard, supra note 71.
217. See, e.g., UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENF’T ACT § 201(c) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1997) (allowing for custody adjudication without personal jurisdiction).
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2. Collateral Consequences of Criminal Prosecution
In addition, to the effect on underlying rights as discussed in Sections
B.1.i–ii, proponents of the minority position have also discussed the prob-
lem of collateral consequences that directly flow from an OFP.218 In Fox,
the Vermont Supreme Court alludes to this as the “prospect of criminal
prosecution” in the forum state and beyond.219 The Fox court is right to
point out the fact that there is a potential collateral consequence of criminal
prosecution, as every state in the country criminally punishes violations of
OFPs.220 However, this collateral consequence is literally no different than
the collateral consequences, which again, stem from other areas of family
law involving the status exception. For example, it is possible that a viola-
tion of a custody and/or parenting time order may result in the violator
being subject to criminal prosecution.221 While many states have varying
punishments and penalties, depending on the degree and severity of the
deprivation, many courts can punish these violations as felonies under state
law.222 Thus, while an OFP may prohibit otherwise legitimate conduct that
could consequently serve as the basis for criminal prosecution, so too could
an interstate custody order serve to prohibit otherwise legal conduct, which
could then serve as the basis for criminal prosecution.
Courts have also cited the fact that criminal prosecution may take
place under federal law, particularly the Violence Against Women Act
(“VAWA”).223 Under VAWA, criminal prosecution may also occur without
an OFP; for example, if the abuser travels interstate to abuse a victim.224
Additionally, VAWA allows for felony punishment of alleged abusers who
travel interstate to commit a crime against a victim when there is a tempo-
rary restraining order.225
In conclusion, the collateral consequences of enhanced criminal prose-
cution under either state or federal law does not change the outcome of
whether or not an OFP without personal jurisdiction is valid. While it is true
that the potential for criminal prosecution is pronounced for violations of
OFPs, these same types of collateral consequences can flow from custody
orders under the UCCJEA. Furthermore, they are not affirmative obliga-
218. See, e.g., Fox v. Fox, 106 A.3d 919, 927 (Vt. 2014).
219. Id. at 926.
220. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4.1 (2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.6 (2009).
221. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.25 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-4 (2012); IOWA CODE
§ 710.6 (1986).
222. See, e.g., Lou Raguse, Lakeville Mom Who Hid Daughters Found Guilty, KARE 11
(Minn.) (July 28, 2016, 6:42 PM), http://www.kare11.com/news/lakeville-mom-who-hid-daughter
-found-guilty/283419489.
223. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2262(b) (2012) (listing federal penalties for persons who travel in
interstate commerce with intent to violate protection order); Fox, 106 A.3d at 927.
224. 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1) (2012).
225. Id. § 2261(b)(6). This is noteworthy because temporary OFPs don’t provide a defendant
with any form of procedural due process as they do not have an opportunity to be heard before the
order is entered against them.
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tions in any sense because they do not require the defendant to act, and they
do not impose an enforcement of liability. They simply clarify that further
violations of an order will result in criminal punishment.226 While they may
make the enforcement of liability more pronounced in the event that an
intervening act occurs, this is also true of other areas of family law.227 As
long as the order does not impose an enhanced chance of criminal prosecu-
tion for things that are not already illegal or not a protected interest, then it
cannot fairly be asserted that it infringes a defendant’s underlying substan-
tive rights.
3. Collateral Consequences — Restriction of a Respondent’s Right
to Bear Arms
Under an amendment to the 1968 Gun Control Act, a defendant that is
subject to a qualified OFP is restricted from possessing any firearms.228
Many states, including Minnesota, have also bolstered statewide firearm
bans against defendants subject to OFPs by requiring a court to seek the
surrender of the defendant’s firearms after certain criteria are met.229 How-
ever, some of these states allow for judicial discretion, while others require
an automatic suspension when a qualified domestic violence order is is-
sued.230 States that require courts to order the defendant to surrender his or
her firearms would obviously be placing an affirmative obligation upon the
defendant, which would be unconstitutional unless that court had personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. However, all courts, regardless of whether
state law mentions or deals with firearms, must place notice language on
OFPs that federal law may ban the possession, sale, etc. of firearms.231
The distinction between affirmative and prohibitory relief is at the out-
set made very difficult because of this section of the Gun Control Act.
While a court that enters an OFP may not affirmatively command you to
relinquish your firearms, the practical effect of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is an
all-out ban on the ability to purchase or own firearms. This ban would have
the impact of unconstitutionally infringing on a protected liberty interest via
a collateral consequence without personal jurisdiction. Therefore, an OFP
must be drafted in an incredibly narrow way to block the triggering of crim-
inal penalties for the possession of firearms.232 The prohibition of firearms
under federal law will trigger after a hearing at which the defendant had
226. However, this would have to exclude firearm restrictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)
(2012).
227. See, e.g., Raguse, supra note 222.
228. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2012).
229. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 6(g) (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3B
(1998); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 (2016).
230. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-105.5 (2013), with MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd.
6(g)–(i) (2016).
231. See 34 U.S.C. § 10449(e)(1)(A) (2017).
232. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2012) (explaining requirements of qualified protective order).
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notice and an opportunity to be heard if the court order either: 1) finds the
defendant represents a credible threat to the physical safety of the petitioner,
or 2) prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against an intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to
cause bodily injury.233 However, some states allow for ex parte orders to
transform into regular OFPs without the need for a hearing, which means
the firearm prohibition under federal law would not be imposed.234
In states where an evidentiary hearing is required by law, there is an-
other way to avoid triggering the firearms ban. The Ninth Circuit has held
that language that does not at least somewhat track 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is
not sufficient to trigger the firearm prohibition under federal law.235 This
might mean that an interstate order could prohibit the defendant from
“breaking the laws of X state,” instead of explicitly saying the defendant is
not allowed “to physically abuse the petitioner” to avoid triggering the fed-
eral ban. This may be a solution in certain interstate domestic violence
cases because physically abusing anyone is already illegal, and thus the
order does not need to specifically prohibit physical abuse.236 It is clear that
the collateral consequence imposed by an interstate OFP under federal law
would restrain a defendant’s right to possess firearms, which would be un-
constitutional if the order was entered without personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.
In the time since the 1994 amendment to the Gun Control Act was
enacted, one federal district court in Texas did find that the statute was
unconstitutional when it criminalized conduct based upon a state civil OFP
without any individualized findings.237 But, the Fifth Circuit subsequently
overruled that opinion by reasoning that the firearms ban is a “narrowly
tailored specific exception or restriction to the Second Amendment.”238 Due
to the fact that federal law bans firearms when a defendant has a qualified
order for protection, coupled with the fact that the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the Second Amendment to confer individuals with a personal right to
233. Id.
234. Compare, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subds. 5(a), (b)(1)–(2) (2016) (stating that a
hearing is not required unless the court declines relief, or one of the parties request a hearing),
with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.730 (2017) (mandating that the court shall summon the parties to
an evidentiary hearing if the judge concludes that domestic violence and abuse exists).
235. Compare United States v. Sanchez, 639 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that an
order prohibiting no contact was not sufficient to trigger 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)), with United
States v. DuBose, 598 F.3d 726, 730–731 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that an order prohibiting
defendant from “hurting” the plaintiff was sufficient to activate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(c)(ii)).
236. If the order is entered ex parte and no evidentiary hearing occurs, then 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(8) will not trigger per the statute’s language.
237. See United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d and remanded,
270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
238. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260–264 (5th Cir. 2001).
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bear arms,239 an OFP that triggers the firearms ban would need personal
jurisdiction over the alleged abuser in order to be constitutional.
In addition to the barriers presented by federal law, many states also
have their own specific firearm laws, which ban the possession and
purchase of firearms, while the defendant is subject to a qualified domestic
violence order.240 In Minnesota, for example, a court must order a defen-
dant to surrender his firearms for the length of the OFP if it: 1) restrains the
abusing party from harassing, stalking, or threatening the petitioner or re-
strains the abusing party from engaging in other conduct that would place
the petitioner in reasonable fear of bodily injury, and 2) includes a finding
that the abusing party represents a credible threat to the physical safety of
the petitioner or prohibits the abusing party from using, attempting to use,
or threatening to use physical force against the petitioner.241 However, as
discussed in Section IV.A, some states may be able to get around this type
of restriction by issuing a “no-finding order” when personal jurisdiction is
lacking.242 A no-finding order would allow the respondent to continue to
possess his firearms, as the order would not contain a finding that the abus-
ing party represents a credible threat to the safety of the petitioner. This
would also be true of the states that either allow judges the discretion to
decide whether to require the defendant to surrender their firearms and
states that do not have any laws that require a defendant to surrender their
firearms.
In conclusion, as discussed in Part IV, there may be a narrowly tai-
lored type of OFP, which does not trigger the firearm ban and could con-
ceivably be valid under the status exception even after an evidentiary
hearing.243 For the states like Minnesota, which allow “no-finding” orders
to be entered, the firearm ban will not be triggered and will allow the order
to preclude the respondent from committing acts of violence against the
petitioner.  But, if the firearm ban is triggered, then it will be a violation of
a defendant’s due process rights since the defendant effectively loses his or
her right to own firearms. A restriction such as this, even though it is not
technically an affirmative obligation, has the effect of infringing a constitu-
239. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 615 (2008).
240. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-36f(b), 29-36k (2016), 46b-15 (2017), 46b-38a
(2012), 53a-217, 53a-217c (2016); FLA. STAT. §§ 741.28 (2003), 741.30(1)(e), (6)(g) (2017),
741.31(4) (2016), 790.233 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 393(1)(D) (2016), tit. 19-A,
§ 4007(1)(A-1) (2017).
241. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 6(g) (2016).
242. See, e.g., 14 MICHAEL BOULETTE, Minnesota Practice § 13:8 (3d ed. 2016). Before an
OFP evidentiary hearing, the judge will ask the respondent if he would either: 1) agree to the order
issuing without contesting the order; 2) agree to a “no-finding” order issuing, which has the same
effect as a regular OFP but does not contain a finding of actual violence; or 3) request that the
order be contested.
243. See discussion supra Section III.B.3. A qualified domestic violence order which directs
the defendant to “violate no laws” and have “no contact with” the petitioner and her family, does
not activate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
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tionally protected right without due process. Thus, in order to pass muster
going forward, any court that enters an interstate OFP against a person over
whom it lacks personal jurisdiction, must do so without activating a collat-
eral firearm restriction.
C. The Practical Problem with Allowing Interstate Victims of Domestic
Violence to Have No Ability to Petition for Protection
Domestic violence continues to be a very big problem not just for vic-
tims and their families but also for society as a whole.244 The actual act of
violence is usually just one of the many injustices that are typically dealt to
a victim of domestic violence. Other injustices that stem from domestic
violence include homelessness, hospital visits, psychological problems, fi-
nancial instability, joblessness, etc.245 These circumstances are potentially
exacerbated if the victim lives in a different state than family members or
friends who may be willing to help by providing financial support or
shelter.
Over the past few decades, our world has come a long way in recog-
nizing—not only the impact of domestic violence—but also that individuals
have a right, as human beings, to be free from domestic violence.246 This
became explicit on the international scale with the Convention to End All
Discrimination Toward Women, which noted that gender-based violence,
which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and
fundamental freedoms under general international law and human rights
conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of Article 1 of the
Convention.247
In the United States, courts have also recognized that victims of do-
mestic violence have “the fundamental human right to be protected from the
devastating impact of family violence.”248 In many instances, we have done
well to further this fight through innovative methods, which include the
creation of the OFP as a civil form of relief. However, we have also, at
244. See Robert Pearl, M.D., Domestic Violence: The Secret Killer That Costs $8.3 Billion
Annually, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2013, 1:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/2013/12/05/
domestic-violence-the-secret-killer-that-costs-8-3-billion-annually/#22cad8b04681.
245. See NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (2003), https://www.cdc.gov/violence prevention/pdf/
ipv book-a.pdf; Susan Johnston Taylor, 5 Financial Challenges Facing Survivors of Domestic
Abuse, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Oct. 26, 2016 10:24 AM), http://money.usnews.com/
money/personal-finance/articles/2016-10-26/5-financial-challenges-facing-survivors-of-domestic-
abuse.
246. See Joe Biden, Twenty-two Years of Progress with the Violence Against Women Act,
MEDIUM (Sept. 13, 2016), https://medium.com/@VPOTUS44/twenty-two-years-of-progress-with-
the-violence-against-women-act-1dc1632ec6a6.
247. UNITED NATIONS, COMM. ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN, General Recommendation No. 19 ¶ 7 (1992).
248. Champagne v. Champagne, 708 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Mass. 1999).
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times, disregarded the seriousness of domestic violence. No such case is a
better representation of this tragic reality than Town of Castle Rock v. Gon-
zalez,249 in which the Supreme Court found that the petitioner did not have
a protected property interest in the enforcement of an OFP after her ex-
husband kidnapped their three children and then murdered them.250 This
was the case even though hours before the children’s deaths, the petitioner
sought police help numerous times for enforcement of her protection order
that was against the ex-husband and in favor of her and her three daugh-
ters.251 In 2011, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found
that “the state failed to act with due diligence to protect Jessica Lenahan-
Gonzalez and [her daughters] Leslie, Kathryn and Rebecca Gonzales from
domestic violence, which violated the state’s obligation not to discriminate
and to provide for equal protection before the law under Article II of the
American Declaration.”252 Furthermore, the Commission noted, “the failure
of the United States to adequately organize its state structure to protect [the
Gonzales girls] from domestic violence was discriminatory and constituted
a violation of their right to life.”253
As the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights articulated in its
report, we must be cognizant of the structure of states and the fact that this
has barred some victims from being able to protect themselves. This is true
even though we agree that victims of domestic violence have a human right
to be free from abuse, and acknowledge that the onus is on the states and
the country as a whole to help facilitate this protection through—not only
enforcement of OFPs—but also by allowing victims that flee from their
abuser in search of shelter to have the ability to petition a court for protec-
tion without either having to return to the state in which they were abused
or wait until their abuser follows them into their new state. To hold that a
state does not have the power to issue a protective order for residents within
its borders not only contravenes state sovereignty, but it also ignores the
long-held power of a state to declare a status on its residents. As our society
continues to become more mobile and interconnected, it is imperative that
we recognize that states not only have the ability to protect victims of do-
mestic violence through a status adjudication, but an obligation that com-
pels such a mandate if the victim wishes to petition a court for protection.
249. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
250. For arguments explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment actually does confer a right of
protection, see Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of the Government: Protection, Liberty, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991).
251. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the Castle Rock decision see Clingan, supra note
176.
252. INTER-AMERICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MERITS JESSICA LENAHAN ET AL., Report
No. 80/11 ¶ 199 Case No. 12.626 (July 21, 2011).
253. Id. ¶ 164.
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IV. SOLUTIONS
“The first duty of the Government is to afford protection to its
citizens.”254
As discussed earlier in this Note, a previously written article by Jessica
Miles255 also concluded that the status exception was applicable in inter-
state domestic violence cases. Miles suggested that the optimal solution in
dealing with interstate domestic violence cases is to allow for temporary
renewable orders.256 To be sure, this solution has many noticeable benefits
including its elimination of affirmative obligations that are imposed by op-
eration of law in certain states such as fines, penalties, and costs. However,
I believe that Miles’s solution has potential disadvantages including contin-
ually needing to renew a temporary OFP. In addition, depending on the
ability and number of times one may be able to renew, the process may
become a disguised way of infringing an out-of-state defendant’s substan-
tive rights indefinitely.257
Below, I have proposed two solutions that could both individually ad-
dress the problems that are now present regarding interstate domestic vio-
lence cases. Solution one is a statute, which issues a prohibitory OFP under
the status exception. Solution two is a set of uniform laws, which combines
certain provisions of both the UCCJEA and the UIFSA and applies these
provisions in the interstate domestic violence context. While no solution
will afford the ultimate solution to either victims or alleged abusers, both
solutions recognize the importance of domestic violence victims’ ability to
protect themselves, alleged abusers due process rights, and state
sovereignty.
A. Solution One: States Pass a Narrowly-Tailored Status Exception
Statute for Interstate Domestic Violence Cases
The first solution represents a codification of the majority rule of law;
however, it is slightly narrower to avoid the due process issues articulated
in Part III. This codification of the majority rule has been passed in one
state already.258 North Dakota’s domestic violence statute contains the
following:
Upon the application of an individual residing within the
state, a court may issue a domestic violence protection order or an
ex parte temporary protection order under this chapter even
though the actions constituting domestic violence occurred exclu-
254. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1987) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth debating the
Reconstruction Act of 1867).
255. Miles, supra note 46, at 141.
256. Id. at 197–200. Essentially a Shah order that is renewable instead of indefinite.
257. This infringement may be most noticeable in its restriction of a defendant’s right to
movement.
258. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (2017).
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sively outside the state. In these cases, a respondent is subject to
the personal jurisdiction of this state upon entry into this state. If
the domestic violence justifying the issuance of a protection order
under this chapter occurred exclusively outside the state, the relief
that may be granted is limited to an order restraining the party
from having contact with or committing acts of domestic violence
on another person in this state.259
North Dakota’s law is certainly a good start; however, as described in Sec-
tion III.B, there are several issues that make the order potentially unconsti-
tutional as a violation of the defendant’s due process rights.
The North Dakota statute could be amended to ensure that victims are
able to petition and receive OFPs, while defendants do not lose any liberty
interests or have any affirmative obligations imposed upon them that would
offend due process. The model statute would appear as follows:
Upon the application of an individual residing within the
state, a court may issue a domestic violence protection order or an
ex parte temporary protection order under this chapter even
though the actions constituting domestic violence occurred exclu-
sively outside the state. In these cases, a respondent is subject to
the personal jurisdiction of this state upon entry into this state, or
by violating an order entered into under this chapter. If the do-
mestic violence justifying the issuance of a protection order under
this chapter occurred exclusively outside the state and no personal
jurisdiction over the respondent can be established, then the relief
that may be granted is limited to an order restraining the party
from having contact with the protected person(s), and restraining
the respondent from breaking any of the laws of X state. To com-
port with procedural due process, the Court must ensure that
before the issuance of the final order, the respondent has both
actual notice of the pending order for protection, and an opportu-
nity to be heard on the merits of that order for protection.
In the above provision, the restriction on the ability to contact the peti-
tioner still validly remains in place; as restricting the respondent’s ability to
contact the petitioner is not a violation of the respondent’s liberty as ex-
plained in Section III.B. Such a provision is also one of the most beneficial
parts of an order because many victims note that contact after an issue of an
OFP is their most frequent problem.260 Some of the other provisions of the
North Dakota law are potentially problematic because if an evidentiary
hearing is required and an order commands the respondent not to commit
acts of domestic violence on another person in the state, then it would acti-
259. Id.
260. See SUSAN L. KEILITZ ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL PROTECTION OR-
DERS: THE BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 38 (1997) (indicating
that the most frequent problem amongst survey participants who had an OFP was the respondent
contacting them via phone).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-2\UST213.txt unknown Seq: 37 10-MAY-18 16:33
566 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2
vate the firearm prohibition contained under federal law. However, if the
order simply commands the respondent not to break any laws within the
state, then it precludes the respondent from engaging in activities like
abuse, assault, stalking, and trespassing on the protected person’s prop-
erty.261 In addition, the statute will not allow the OFP to restrict the defen-
dant from going to public areas.
This solution, while not necessarily the most ideal for either the peti-
tioner262 or respondent,263 adequately puts in place protections for the peti-
tioner while in the forum state. Several studies have indicated that the OFP
process can benefit the petitioner in several ways including by acting as an
influential deterrent for further abuse,264 allowing the petitioner to take
greater control of their environment,265 and actively improving the quality
of a petitioner’s life.266 It also has the added benefit of a heightened re-
sponse from police when the subject of an OFP reports a violation.267 The
forum state’s interest in protecting citizens within its borders is also met as
it will be able to issue an OFP without having to wait for one of the two
possibilities described in Caplan.268 Lastly, the respondent’s interests are
also adequately met as they will have no personal affirmative obligations
against them and their substantive rights will not be implicated,269 as the
order will only ban future communication and acts which are already
illegal.
It is true that in the past many have criticized the OFP process as an
attempt by some to gain a leg up on their opponent in some ancillary family
court proceeding. While there have been some documented instances of this
type of behavior, there are generally many reasons a petitioner is unable to
substantiate their accusations of domestic violence.270 This issue notwith-
261. See discussion supra Section III.B.3.
262. For many victims, it represents a somewhat watered-down version of relief they may be
able to receive in places like Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.
263. For alleged abusers, this statute would go further than the typical response, which is no
relief for a victim in an interstate domestic violence case.
264. See KEILITZ ET AL., supra note 260, at ix–x (results indicating that the process of seeking
a temporary protection order can have a positive effect in terms of deterring future violence).
265. Id. at 44 (results indicating that the process of seeking a temporary protection order can
have a positive effect in terms of allowing the victim to take greater control over their
environment).
266. Id. at ix (indicating that OFPs correspond with improving victim’s personal well-being).
267. Many states have mandatory arrest laws when there is probable cause to believe a person
has violated an OFP or otherwise committed a crime of domestic violence. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 18.65.530(A) (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3601(B) (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-
803.6 (2001), NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.137 (1999).
268. 1) Require the victim to return to the state where the violence occurred, or 2) Force the
victim to wait in the forum state until the abuser commits an act within the forum state. Caplan v.
Donovan, 879 N.E.2d 117, 123 (Mass. 2008).
269. Including a relinquishment of their firearms or restrictions of the ability to go certain
places.
270. Janet R. Johnston et al., Allegations and substantiations of abuse in custody-disputing
families, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 283 (2005) (explaining that a notable percentage of allegations cannot
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standing, the type of order imagined in this solution should dispel all con-
cerns for defendants who are completely innocent of everything alleged in
the petitioner’s complaint. This is not only because the order is incredibly
narrowly-tailored and does not provide any restriction on otherwise permis-
sible behavior, but also because an order which does not contain a finding
of domestic abuse will not help a petitioner in any future family court
action.271
In conclusion, this solution represents a way of balancing the state’s
right as a sovereign to protect its citizens, the victim’s right to be free from
abusive behavior, and the defendant’s right to due process regarding his or
her substantive rights.
B. Solution Two: The Interstate Domestic Violence Jurisdiction Act
(IDVJA)
The second solution is the creation of a uniform set of laws known as
the Interstate Domestic Violence Jurisdiction Act (“IDVJA”). The IDVJA
would consist of a combination of similar provisions from both the UIFSA
and the UCCJEA and would allow for states to transfer OFPs to a jurisdic-
tion that has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The IDVJA would
also have a “temporary emergency jurisdiction” provision, which would al-
low the forum state to enter a temporary order that would protect the victim
in the interim until a hearing on the merits can occur in the state that has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The IDVJA would allow for one
controlling order that could be registered in any jurisdiction that the parties
are in or move to in the future. The IDVJA would also be ideal for cases in
which the victim would like more relief than what could be potentially pro-
vided under the first solution. This relief would allow for any type of af-
firmative obligation, such as child support, restriction of firearms, etc. The
IDVJA would also ensure that orders could be transferred from state to state
should the petitioner want to transfer the order to a new state because they
would meet the requirements for Full Faith and Credit under VAWA and
the United States Constitution.272 This is true because VAWA requires full
faith and credit for all valid orders entered with jurisdiction over the par-
be substantiated in domestic violence proceedings involving children; however, several explana-
tions are likely at play including: 1) sometimes real abuse can be hard to substantiate; 2) some-
times one parent has a good faith belief that abuse has occurred but they are incorrect; and 3)
sometimes individuals do maliciously fabricate stories of abuse to gain an advantage in a pending
dissolution or custody hearing).
271. See 14 MICHAEL BOULETTE, MINNESOTA PRACTICE § 13:18 (3d ed. 2016) (explaining that
in instances of easily proven domestic violence allegations, practitioners will, on occasion, coun-
sel clients to deny the allegations but allow a no-finding order to issue).
272. 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2012).
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ties.273 Thus, under the IDVJA, victims would be entitled to the normal full
faith and credit provisions of federal law because the orders would be en-
tered with personal jurisdiction.
Perhaps the biggest hurdle in implementation of the IVDJA is the fact
that it would require every state to enact a uniform law, similar to the enact-
ment of UIFSA in the 1990s.274 In order to pass the IVDJA, the federal
government could attach additional VAWA funds on the basis that each
state enacts the IVDJA. Another potential problem that would face this uni-
form set of laws is attorney initiation. Typically, the public authority will
handle most UIFSA cases by initiating a petition in the county in which IV-
D services are requested by the petitioner or the county in which some type
of welfare benefit is being expended on behalf of the minor child.275 The
initiating county attorney’s office then forwards the petition to the county
attorney’s office where the defendant resides, so that the receiving county
attorney’s office can bring the action there. This may prove problematic
when private attorneys are the only individuals bringing these actions.
Thus, in order for the plan to work appropriately, domestic violence agen-
cies and programs would have to coordinate and help each other so that a
petitioner initiating their petition would be able to have representation in the
county in which the defendant resides. As a part of the IVDJA, considera-
tions to the ability of the petitioner to appear via videoconference should
also be explored as suggested by Jessica Miles.276
The IDVJA would have multiple, almost identical sections to the
UIFSA. For starters, the IVDJA would prescribe the valid basis for a peti-
tioner to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.277 The other
provisions in this section would include the applicable duration of personal
jurisdiction, the initiating and responding parties in the particular state, a
determination of controlling orders, how to begin proceeding under this act,
application of the law of the state, duties of initiating tribunal, duties and
powers of responding tribunal, etc.
The IDVJA would also include a provision allowing for temporary,
emergency jurisdiction, similar to the UCCJEA. This provision would es-
sentially operate as normal ex parte orders operate. The order would be in
effect until an evidentiary hearing could be held in the IVDJA case. The
273. Id. It should be noted that it is likely that Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Iowa, and
Kentucky would likely accept an interstate OFP from another state; however, this probably would
not be the same approach taken by Vermont and other states.
274. All states were required to enact UIFSA in 1998 as a condition to receive federal funds
for family support enforcement.
275. See MINN. STAT. § 518A.26, subd. 10 (2016) (defining IV-D cases as a case where a
party has assigned to the state rights to child support because of the receipt of public assistance as
defined in section 256.741 or has applied for child support services under title IV-D of the SOC.
SEC. ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 654(4) (2014)).
276. Miles, supra note 46, at 201.
277. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518C.201 (2015).
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restrictions for the temporary order would be the same as in a regular ex
parte order.
In conclusion, the IDVJA allows victims of domestic violence to get a
full OFP with all of the normal remedies that would generally attach with-
out the petitioner being forced to go back to the state where the domestic
violence occurred. It would also provide for an interstate ex parte OFP,
which would attach a huge benefit to the process, and would allow the vic-
tim and the victim’s attorney to stay in the state in which the victim cur-
rently resides. For these reasons, it helps cure the different untenable
scenarios noted by both the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Caplan,278
and the Vermont Supreme Court in Fox.279
V. CONCLUSION
In terms of practicality, states should immediately move to enact legis-
lation in accordance with the first solution. This move will provide a quick
state-to-state level response for dealing with the issue of interstate domestic
violence. The second solution should be seen as an aspirational level solu-
tion that the federal government should aim to enact in the future to allow
for greater continuity amongst all states in regard to the procedure for ob-
taining and enforcing an interstate OFP.
This Note represents an attempt to provide context to a discussion that
is immensely important to the future of many. The end goal of these solu-
tions should be to promote protection for petitioners and fairness to respon-
dents. During parts of the last century, when violence occurred between two
intimate partners, the justice system was generally hesitant to become in-
volved and labeled such acts as private matters.280 Through the subsequent
years, victims and advocates built a movement to end domestic violence,
which began with civil OFPs, no-fault divorce, women’s shelters, etc. and
eventually succeeded in beginning to change a culture.281 It is time to con-
tinue that progress by creating a process that allows survivors of domestic
violence, who are fleeing violence by going across state lines, the ability to
seek shelter and protection in their new state.
278. See Caplan v. Donovan, 879 N.E.2d 117, 123 (Mass. 2008).
279. See Fox v. Fox, 106 A.3d 919, 927 (Vt. 2014).
280. Rebecca Hulse, Privacy and Domestic Violence in Court, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 237, 241–242 (2010).
281. Eliana Dockterman, 50 Years Ago, Doctors Called Domestic Violence ‘Therapy’, TIME
(Sept. 25, 2014), http://time.com/3426225/domestic-violence-therapy/.
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